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The Effects of Risk Management on Management Forecast Behavior  
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Prior research examines several reasons why managers voluntarily disclose information, but 
provides relatively little evidence as to whether day-to-day operational decisions influence a 
manager’s disclosure choice. In this study, we examine whether a particular operational activity 
– risk management through the use of derivatives – affects whether a manager decides to issue 
earnings forecasts. Using a large hand-collected sample of derivatives users and non-users, we 
find that derivatives users are more likely to issue earnings forecasts relative to non-users. We 
then find that this result is stronger when the use of derivatives makes it less costly for managers 
to issue forecasts and to meet or beat those forecasted earnings. Interestingly, however, we find 
no evidence that managers provide these forecasts when investors are more likely to demand 
them. Overall, our results suggest that operational decisions can influence management forecast 
policy, but only when these decisions make it easier for the managers to predict future earnings. 
This study thus provides evidence that voluntary disclosure has a role, but with limitation, in 
helping investors understand the complexity of derivatives.   
 
Keywords: voluntary disclosure; management forecasts; derivatives; hedge accounting 
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1. Introduction  
While there are a large number of studies in the accounting literature that examine why 
managers decide to voluntarily disclose information (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010), 
there is relatively little evidence as to whether day-to-day operational decisions influence 
disclosure choice. We fill this void in the literature by examining whether a particular 
operational activity – risk management through the use of derivatives – affects whether a 
manager decides to issue an earnings forecast. Specifically, we examine three research 
questions. First, how does the use of derivatives influence the likelihood that managers provide 
an earnings forecast? 1  Second, is the association between the use of derivatives and 
management forecasting activity stronger when managers use derivatives in a way that makes 
earnings easier to forecast? Finally, is the association between the use of derivatives and 
management forecast activity stronger when investors are more likely to demand the forecasts? 
The extent to which risk management activities affect firms’ disclosure decisions is of 
interest not only to academic researchers, but also to investors, regulators, and practitioners. 
Specifically, derivatives are a significant component of the economy, as derivatives account 
for approximately $710 trillion in economic activity and are used by nearly two-thirds of U.S. 
non-financial firms (BIS 2013). Furthermore, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and the big four accounting firms have recently expressed concerns that current 
disclosure requirements fail to fully inform investors about the financial statement implications 
of derivatives activities (FASB 2008; Ernst & Young 2010; FASB 2016).2 Consistent with 
these concerns, empirical evidence suggests that, on average, neither investors nor 
sophisticated investors understand the implications of derivatives for future earnings 
                                                          
1 Although the frequency of management earnings forecasts is the variable of interest in this study, we also investigate the 
likelihood that managers provide earnings forecasts using a binary variable. Our inferences are unchanged.  
2 In fact, the FASB issued a series of ten derivatives-related accounting standards in the last thirty years in an effort to 
standardize the accounting for derivatives and to increase mandatory derivatives disclosures. 
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(Campbell 2015; Campbell, Downes, and Schwartz 2015; Chang, Donohoe, and Sougiannis 
2016). That is, on average, managers are not providing sufficient disclosures to help investors 
understand the implications of derivatives use for firm value. Thus, understanding how firms’ 
derivatives use affects managers’ disclosure choices should be of interest to regulators, 
practitioners, and investors.  
Ex ante, it is not clear how the use of derivatives impacts the decision to issue 
management earnings forecasts (MEFs). On one hand, derivatives use could decrease the extent 
to which managers provide management forecasts. Specifically, managers often outsource their 
hedging policy to consultants and may not themselves be comfortable with the complexity 
associated with derivatives strategies (Kawaller 2004). Furthermore, forward-looking 
disclosures on hedging gains and losses might reveal proprietary information, particularly 
when firms are hedging forecasted transactions and using cash flow hedge accounting 
(DeMarzo and Duffie 1991; Sapra 2002; Hoang and Ruckes 2014). Therefore, providing 
forecasts when firms engage in hedging activity might invite further scrutiny about the hedging 
activities or other forward-looking information that could be used against the manager or the 
firm by its competitors, customers, or suppliers. To the extent that managers perceive that 
derivatives use increases their reputation or career concerns or their firm’s proprietary costs, 
they may be less willing to provide management forecasts.  
On the other hand, derivatives use could increase the extent to which managers provide 
earnings forecasts through two mechanisms. First, if firms use derivatives in a way that reduces 
the exposure of their profits to market-wide risks, derivatives will reduce uncertainty about 
future earnings and cash flows (e.g., Minton and Schrand 1999; Zhang 2009). This reduction 
in uncertainty should make it easier to predict future earnings levels and thus easier to not only 
issue forecasts but also to meet or beat those forecasted earnings. That is, managers are more 
likely to supply forecasts when it is less costly for them to do so. We label this reduction in the 
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cost of providing management forecasts as the “supply” channel. Given that managers make 
disclosure decisions before they observe whether derivatives use in fact results in lower future 
earnings volatility, it is unclear, ex-ante, how managers will respond to the use of derivatives.3  
A second mechanism through which the use of derivatives could increase management 
forecast activity is because derivatives are financial contracts that add complexity to 
understanding how macroeconomic trends affect a firm’s earnings. Prior studies show that even 
sophisticated market participants (e.g., analysts) struggle to understand the earnings 
implications of derivatives (Campbell et al. 2015; Chang et al. 2016). This complexity may 
lead capital market participants such as analysts and institutional investors to demand increased 
disclosure about a firm’s earnings (i.e., MEFs) (Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Lungqvist 
2014). We label this increased demand for management forecasts as the “demand” channel. 
Using a hand-collected sample of 21,880 derivatives users/non-users, we regress the 
likelihood that managers issue an earnings forecast on whether a firm uses derivatives in its 
operations after controlling for several other known determinants of management forecast 
activity. Consistent with the use of derivatives making it easier to predict earnings and thus to 
meet or beat forecasted earnings, we find a positive association between the use of derivatives 
and the frequency of management forecasts. These results are robust to using a difference-in-
differences research design, showing that firms issue more earnings forecasts after they initiate 
the use of derivatives and that firms issue fewer earnings forecasts after they terminate the use 
of derivatives.4 This time-series variation in MEFs is particularly interesting because earning 
guidance policy is generally sticky over time absent changes in strong economic determinants 
of MEFs (i.e., the initiation/termination of users). Overall, these results suggest that when firms 
                                                          
3 Our study thus differs from prior studies that examine earning volatility and MEF. This study focuses on future earnings 
uncertainty instead of past earning volatility. 
4 We use derivatives initiation (termination) as an event to examine the effect of derivatives on MEFs. To account for the 
endogeneity in a firm’s decision to use derivatives, we use propensity score matching to identify a control group of non-
derivatives users. See Section 4 for details. 
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use derivatives, they are more likely to provide earnings forecasts relative to firms that do not 
use derivatives.  
In the second stage of our analysis, we perform several cross-sectional tests to 
disentangle the “supply” and “demand” channels. Specifically, to test the “supply” channel, we 
partition the sample into subsets of observations in which derivatives are most likely to reduce 
the volatility of earnings and thus make it easier for managers to forecast future earnings, 
namely, (1) when firms apply hedge accounting instead of non-hedge accounting, (2) when 
firms more effectively hedge against market risk, and (3) when firms use derivatives after 
SFAS 133, which made it easier for derivatives to reduce the volatility of earnings.5 The results 
confirm that the positive association between the use of derivatives and the frequency of 
management forecasts is stronger across all three of these partitions. These cross-sectional 
results support the notion that using derivatives makes it easier to issue forecasts and to meet 
or beat those forecasted earnings (i.e., the “supply” channel).  
To test the “demand” channel, we partition the sample into subsets of observations in 
which investors are most likely to demand earnings forecasts from derivatives users, namely, 
(1) when firms use more complex derivatives, (2) when firms have higher analyst following, 
and (3) when firms have higher institutional ownership. When sophisticated investors do not 
understand the implications of derivatives for firm performance (Campbell et al. 2015; Chang 
et al. 2016), they will demand guidance from the derivatives users on the expected gains/losses 
related to derivatives. We find no evidence that the positive association between the use of 
derivatives and the frequency of management forecasts is stronger across these three partitions. 
Thus, these cross-sectional results do not support the argument that the association between the 
                                                          
5 Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133), Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities, is an accounting standard issued in June 1998 by the FASB that requires companies to measure all derivatives on 
their balance sheet at fair value. SFAS 133 also extends hedge accounting to all instruments and allows firms to recognize 
gains/losses on hedged items and derivatives in the same accounting period for highly effective, qualifying hedges. This 
accounting standard is now codified under ASC 815.  
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use of derivatives and greater voluntary disclosure is due to the increased demand for 
management forecasts (i.e., we find no support for the investor “demand” channel). Overall, 
our results suggest that firms’ risk management activities (i.e., derivatives use) influence 
managers’ disclosure decisions, primarily due to the impact that the use of derivatives has on 
the cost and effort of producing earnings forecasts and subsequently meeting earnings targets. 
In additional analyses, we provide further evidence that derivatives are linked to 
increased forecast activity by showing that foreign currency hedgers are more likely to issue 
sales forecasts than interest rate hedgers because foreign currency hedges often relate to sales 
activities and thus make sales forecasts easier to make, which is again consistent with the 
“supply” channel. We also examine the impact of derivatives use on the properties of MEFs 
other than the number of forecasts made, such as their timeliness, precision (i.e., a point 
estimate vs. a range estimate), and accuracy. We find that derivatives users are more likely to 
make forecasts that are point estimates and have greater forecast accuracy, again supporting 
the “supply” channel. Overall, our findings show that managers not only increase the frequency 
of their disclosure but also issue more informative disclosures. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the voluntary 
disclosure literature as the first study to connect risk management policy to disclosure policy. 
More importantly, we provide evidence on the mechanism that leads to more voluntary 
disclosures for derivatives users. Our study extends our understanding of why managers 
provide more (or less) disclosure. Specifically, the relation between derivatives and disclosure 
varies with the choice of hedge accounting, the effectiveness of hedging activities, and the 
types of exposure hedged. We, thus, answer calls for research on the motivations behind 
managers’ decisions to provide voluntary disclosure (Core 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Beyer et al. 2010; Leuz and Wysocki 2016). 
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Second, we contribute to the literature examining the interplay between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure by documenting the extent to which a firm’s use of derivatives interacts 
with its disclosure policy, providing implications for regulators. Numerous parties (including 
the FASB and the Securities and Exchange Commission) have expressed concerns over the 
complexity of SFAS 133 and the ability of investors to understand the financial statement 
implications of derivatives use (SEC 2008; Ernst & Young 2010; FASB 2016) and regulators 
have attempted to improve the mandatory disclosure requirements. Our finding that managers 
provide forecasts that are easier to produce (and meet), but do not provide forecasts when 
investors have a greater need for them, suggests that managers’ cost of supplying forecasts, 
and not investor demand, dominates the decision to issue forecasts. In fact, we document that 
managers are less likely to provide voluntary disclosure when investors would need it the most 
(i.e., when managers are speculating and increasing the overall firm risk as 
speculator/ineffective hedgers or non-hedge accounting users).6 These findings suggest that 
managers’ self-interest (reputational and career concerns) dominates investor demand.7 Thus, 
if regulators wish to protect those investors that need enhanced derivatives-related earnings 
disclosures the most, our results suggest that they will need to mandate such disclosure.8 
 Lastly, an implicit assumption in management earnings forecast studies is that 
managers can obtain the information for a forecast in a relatively cost efficient way (as they 
are likely already forecasting earnings internally). Managers are assumed to then decide 
whether to disclose or hide that information. While it is difficult to observe the cost of 
supplying MEFs, this study provides novel empirical evidence that managers’ reputational and 
                                                          
6  A number of risk management surveys document that the number of speculator/ineffective hedgers is non-trivial and deserves 
the policy-makers attention (Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston 1996; Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston 1998; Bodnar, Giambona, Graham, 
Harvey, and Marston 2011).  
7 This cross-sectional test helps alleviate the concerns that no results from the demand channel may be due to lack of statistical 
power or noisy proxy.   
8 An example of potential mandatory disclosure items is hedged/unhedged portions of risk exposure (hedge ratio). Mandating 
disclosures on the hedge ratio would help investors gauge the effects of hedges on earnings because the net gain/loss from 
hedged and unhedged items ultimately impacts the bottom line earnings (Kawaller 2004).  
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career concerns are an important source of agency cost for issuing MEFs and that risk-averse 
managers may be reluctant to undertake value-enhancing activities such as voluntary 
disclosure. This finding has implications for the literature because the lack of management 
disclosure documented in prior studies may not be due to managerial decisions to withhold 
information from investors but rather a byproduct of the manager’s utility function (i.e., risk 
aversion) that could possibly be mitigated through the use of options and severance pay 
compensation schemes.  
 
2. Related Literature 
Determinants and Consequences of Derivatives Use 
Determinants of Derivatives Use 
The main reason firms enter into derivatives contracts is to reduce the cash flow 
volatility associated with certain market-wide risks that are beyond the control of managers. 
Not surprisingly, prior research finds that firms are more likely to hedge when cash flow 
volatility is a greater concern for them, i.e., when firms have higher growth opportunities and 
are closer to bankruptcy (Smith and Stulz 1985; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993; Géczy, 
Minton, and Schrand 1997). In addition, there are a number of manager-specific reasons why 
hedging can be useful. For instance, a manager with a stock option portfolio with high delta 
and/or low vega is likely to prefer less volatile stock prices, and thus will be more likely to 
engage in hedging activities (Smith and Stulz 1985). Finally, larger firms are more likely to 
use derivatives because the costs of a derivatives program can be prohibitive for small firms 
(Géczy et al. 1997; Bodnar, Hayt, Marston, and Smithson 1995). Overall, firms are likely to 
hedge market risks if they expect that the reduced cash flow volatility will increase firm value. 
Consequences of Derivatives Use 
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Theory predicts that the use of derivatives lowers the volatility of future cash flows and 
earnings, and empirical research has shown that on average, this is indeed the case (e.g., Minton 
and Schrand 1999; Guay 1999). This decrease in cash flow volatility has a number of benefits, 
including a lower cost of debt, higher levels of investment, and a lower likelihood of having 
investment restrictions in loan agreements (Minton and Schrand 1999; Campello, Lin, Ma, and 
Zou 2011).  
However, prior research also documents that derivatives users incur a number of direct 
and indirect costs (e.g., Bodnar et al. 2011). For example, survey evidence suggests that the 
use of derivatives involves significant direct costs, with 45% of survey respondents indicating 
moderate to high levels of concern regarding costs associated with derivatives (Bodnar et al. 
1995). Direct costs include bid-ask spreads and premiums on derivatives contracts, employee 
compensation, consulting fees, and documentation costs (Bodnar et al. 2011). A foreign 
exchange manager of a U.S. based manufacturer estimated these costs at $1.5 million annually 
(Brown 2001). Finally, research finds that complexity from derivatives leads to less accurate 
and more dispersed analyst earnings forecasts, which impose indirect costs on firms’ 
information environment (Campbell et al. 2015; Chang et al. 2016). 
Overall, the literature documents a number of costs and benefits associated with the use 
of financial derivatives in a firm’s broader risk management strategy. We contribute to this 
stream of literature by adding an additional benefit associated with the use of derivatives (at 
least in certain contexts); namely, an increase in the quality of MEFs. Furthermore, this increase 
in management forecast quality seems to be driven by a lower cost of supplying earnings 
forecasts for derivatives users relative to those firms that do not use derivatives.  
Determinants and Consequences of Management Earnings Forecasts  
The Costs and Benefits of Management Earnings Forecasts 
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A long line of accounting research examines why firms voluntarily disclose 
information. Managers face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosure when 
making their disclosure policies. Disclosures impose at least some direct costs for the manager 
and the firm as managers must expend time and effort in gathering the requisite information 
for an earnings forecast. Voluntary disclosures can also increase reputation, career, litigation, 
and proprietary costs. For example, Baginski, Campbell, Hinson, and Koo (2018) show that 
career concerns can affect disclosure choices because managers with strong career concerns 
have incentives to delay bad news disclosures. Furthermore, inaccurate MEFs lead to higher 
career, reputational, and litigation costs (Stocken 2000; Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2011). 
Research also shows that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts in less litigious 
reporting environments (i.e., Canada) (Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 2002) and are more 
likely to obscure information in more competitive industries (Verrecchia and Weber 2006). 
However, empirical evidence for the proprietary cost hypothesis is mixed (Cao, Ma, Tucker, 
and Wan 2017). Overall, managers not only consider the direct costs of providing management 
forecasts, but also costs related to litigation, career, and reputation when earnings are difficult 
to forecast. Improving the accuracy of management forecasts (by reducing earnings volatility 
through the use of derivatives) can decrease managements’ exposure to these disclosure costs. 
 Research also reveals several benefits related to issuing a MEF. Economic theory 
suggests that by reducing the information asymmetry between firms and investors, disclosures 
can increase the liquidity of a firm’s stock (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Easley and O’Hara 
2004). Specifically, greater disclosure can reduce the adverse selection component of the bid-
ask spread. In addition, studies show that disclosure policies can affect a firm’s cost of capital 
by either reducing estimation risk or affecting the pricing of information quality (Barry and 
Brown 1985; Easley and O’Hara 2004). Finally, as just discussed, the effort exerted by 
managers in making voluntary disclosures should provide better internal information on firm 
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performance. This should not only help managers provide higher quality disclosures, but also 
improve their ability to make value-increasing investment decisions (Hemmer and Labro 2008; 
Dorantes, Li, Peters, and Richardson 2013; Ittner and Michels 2017).   
 
3. Hypothesis Development  
Risk management activities (i.e., the use of financial derivatives) can affect firms’ 
disclosure decisions in several ways. On one hand, managers may face incentives to reduce the 
frequency of earnings forecasts when their firms use derivatives due to the added complexity 
associated with derivatives (Harris and Rajgopal 2017). Furthermore, prior research, as well as 
anecdotal evidence, suggests that forward-looking disclosures on hedging gains and losses can 
reveal proprietary information (DeMarzo and Duffie 1991; Sapra 2002; Hoang and Ruckes 
2014). For example, in a comment letter to the FASB’s exposure draft of SFAS 133, the Edison 
Electric Institute (EEI) stated that, “the proposed level of detail required in disclosures may be 
used with other footnote disclosures which inadvertently require the disclosure of 
competitively sensitive information.” Therefore, managers may not want to issue earnings 
forecasts when using derivatives for fear of disclosing proprietary information directly or 
indirectly by inviting further questions about hedging activities. For example, in a recent 
survey, a CFO recently noted “I would jump on the [conference] call when the question 
involved taxes or foreign currency. We did not get into the weeds of what was hedged. We 
never told them what short-term or long-term exposures were hedged” (Harris and Rajgopal 
2017). 
Furthermore, financial derivatives advisory firms offer risk management services 
including hedge structuring, execution, documentation, and reporting, and corporate needs for 
these services are evidenced by their large presence. Thus, not all managers are fully informed 
of the details of their firm’s risk management strategy and its expected impact on future 
 11 
 
 
earnings. For example, one CFO mentioned, “most CEOs care about net income or earnings 
and understand at a broad level that they have foreign businesses[,] and [that] foreign currency 
can affect earnings from those businesses but that’s about it.” (Harris and Rajgopal 2017). 
Managers may be reluctant to issue earnings forecasts if they do not fully understand the impact 
of derivatives on earnings. For these reasons, the frequency of MEFs might decrease when a 
firm uses derivatives.   
On the other hand, the frequency of MEFs might increase when a firm uses derivatives 
through at least two mechanisms. First, although forecasting earnings is time-consuming and 
involves considerable managerial effort (Bamber and Cheon 1998), risk management strategies 
such as hedging with derivatives can reduce the volatility of future cash flows and earnings. 
As a result, these strategies could reduce the time and effort (i.e., the cost) expended in 
forecasting earnings. For example, a corn producer can sell corn for whatever the market price 
happens to be after the harvest, or alternatively lock in a price in advance by selling a futures 
contract for at least a portion of their expected harvest. The futures contract will stabilize the 
corn producer’s revenues, making it easier to forecast next-period sales. Given this reduction 
in uncertainty, managers may be more likely to forecast earnings because it is easier to predict 
earnings and thus easier to meet the predicted earnings targets. Moreover, meeting these targets 
enable the managers to avoid any reputation or career concerns, or litigation costs associated 
with missing earnings forecasts (Skinner 1994; Baginski et al. 2002; Kothari, Li and Short 
2009; Baginski et al. 2018). Because managers are more likely to supply forecasts when it is 
less costly for them to do so, we label these direct and indirect reductions in the costs of 
providing management forecasts as the “supply” channel. 
Second, investors may demand more disclosure from derivatives users. Prior studies 
show that market participants such as investors and analysts do not fully understand the 
implications of derivatives use for firm value (Campbell 2015; Campbell et al. 2015; Chang et 
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al. 2016). Thus, derivatives users might be more likely to issue earnings forecasts if this 
information is demanded by a firm’s financial analysts and sophisticated institutional investors. 
Failure to provide disclosure when investors demand it can have negative consequences for a 
firm’s reputation and stock price because analysts may decide to stop following the firm and 
sophisticated investors may decide to “vote with their feet” and sell their shares (Bhushan 1989; 
Parrino, Sias, and Starks 2003; Roulstone 2003). We label this increased demand for 
management forecasts as the “demand” channel. Ultimately, whether derivatives use affects 
the likelihood that a firm provides management earnings forecasts is an empirical question. 
Accordingly, we test the following non-directional hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: There is no relation between the use of derivatives and the frequency 
of MEFs. 
 
Tests of the “Supply” Channel Explanation 
Next, we develop cross-sectional tests to better understand whether the results of H1 
are affected by firms’ incentives under the “supply” or “demand” channels. To do so, we first 
focus on the “supply” channel, and devise cross-sectional tests for this channel by discussing 
how accounting for derivatives helps derivatives users forecast their future earnings. 
Specifically, we break the use of derivatives down by (1) the decision to use hedge accounting, 
(2) the effectiveness with which derivatives reduce a firm’s exposure to market risk, and (3) 
the impact of SFAS 133. We predict that these different types of derivatives use have different 
effects on the cost of supplying MEFs. That is, each of these cases should make future cash 
flows and earnings less volatile and, thus, make it easier to issue forecasts and to meet or beat 
those forecasted earnings. 
Accounting Choice of Hedge Accounting  
Firms can choose whether to designate derivatives as a hedge (under “hedge 
accounting” rules), or treat the derivatives as trading derivatives that do not receive hedge 
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accounting treatment. If the derivatives are not designated as a hedge, changes in the fair value 
of the derivatives must be recorded currently in net income – regardless of when changes in 
the fair value of the hedged item are recorded. Thus, if a firm does not qualify for hedge 
accounting, its earnings could be even more volatile than if it had not chosen to use derivatives 
at all. In contrast, if a firm elects hedge accounting then gains and losses on both the derivatives 
and hedged item are recognized in the same period, and this reduction in earnings volatility 
will lower the cost of forecasting future earnings.  
To illustrate these concepts, consider the following example. Assume that in year t, a 
firm hedges the next-period forecasted purchase of corn. Without hedge accounting, the change 
in the fair value of the derivatives would be recognized in earnings in year t and the price of 
the underlying purchase would be recorded at its market price in year t+1 (this timing mismatch 
exacerbates earnings volatility because the hedge gain or loss moves in one direction while the 
underlying price moves in the opposite direction). However, with hedge accounting, 
gains/losses on derivatives are recognized in the earnings in year t+1 (offsetting the inventory 
purchase and thus resulting in no change in future earnings volatility).  
Given the reduction in future earnings volatility, it is clearly easier to forecast earnings 
when hedge accounting is elected because the firm can more easily forecast the cost of goods 
sold in the next period (see Appendix B, Example 1 for a detailed example). Therefore, if 
managers provide forecasts because they are less costly to produce, we would expect to find 
that the relation between the use of derivatives and MEFs is stronger when managers elect 
hedge accounting relative to when they do not: 
HYPOTHESIS 2A: The frequency of MEFs is higher for hedge accounting users relative 
to non-hedge accounting users. 
 
Sensitivity to Underlying Price Movements 
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A firm may elect not to use hedge accounting, but still use derivatives to reduce its 
exposure to the price of an underlying item (e.g., interest rate, foreign exchange rate, or 
commodity price). Furthermore, even if a firm elects hedge accounting, there is wide variation 
in the extent to which it can hedge its full exposure to these underlying items. Surveys find that 
firms hedge far less than 100 percent of their exposure, and that the hedge ratio is determined 
by factors such as firm size, risk, and the delta and vega of the manager’s stock portfolio (Smith 
and Stulz 1985; Froot et al. 1993; Géczy et al. 1997). That is, the election of hedge accounting 
may not be a sufficiently powerful measure of the extent to which the use of derivatives reduces 
the volatility of a firm’s earnings. Appendix B, Example 2 provides an example. 
Therefore, an alternative way to assess the “success” of a firm’s derivatives program is 
to examine whether its market risk exposure is lower after initiating the derivatives program. 
The lower the ex-post risk exposure, the more effective the firm has been in reducing future 
earnings volatility by using derivatives. If managers provide forecasts because they are less 
costly to produce, the relation between the use of derivatives and MEF quality should be 
stronger if the firms also use derivatives to reduce their sensitivity to market risks: 
HYPOTHESIS 2B: The frequency of MEFs is higher for firms that use derivatives to 
reduce their sensitivity to market risks.  
 
The Impact of SFAS 133 
Finally, SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivatives Instruments and Hedging Activities, 
was introduced to make the hedge accounting rules more accurately reflect underlying hedging 
relationships and to make it easier to achieve a reduction in future earnings volatility (FASB 
1998). Specifically, SFAS 133 allows more instruments to qualify for hedge accounting, 
requires the hedges to be more effective, and allows firms to account for these hedges to 
minimize their earnings volatility. 9 Therefore, the use of hedge accounting in the post-SFAS 
                                                          
9 Specifically, SFAS 133 requires firms to report all derivatives at fair value while allowing hedge accounting under certain 
conditions. First, prior to SFAS 133, the accounting for derivatives was determined by the treatment of the hedged items. Thus, 
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133 period is likely to result in lower earnings forecasting costs than in the pre-SFAS 133 
period. If managers provide forecasts when they are less costly to produce, the relation between 
the use of derivatives and MEF quality should be stronger when the firms designate derivatives 
as hedges in the post-SFAS 133 period relative to the pre-SFAS 133 period:  
HYPOTHESIS 2C: The frequency of MEFs is higher in the post-SFAS 133 period relative 
to the pre-SFAS 133 period for hedge accounting users.  
 
However, counter forces exist against H2A, H2B, and H2C (the “supply” channel explanation). 
Specifically, the use of derivatives and hedge accounting do not necessarily reduce uncertainty 
in future earnings as ex-post hedge results may not be successful. Furthermore, managers may 
use derivatives for non-hedging activities (i.e., speculation), which could make their future 
earnings more (not less) certain. In addition, forward-looking disclosures (such as earnings 
guidance) are protected by the “safe harbor” regulations, which reduce the litigation costs 
associated with providing inaccurate earnings forecasts. Finally, if earnings are easier to 
predict, the benefits associated with providing a management forecast should also be lower. 
Specifically, in these cases, there is less information asymmetry between managers and 
external capital market participants such as financial analysts and institutional investors. Thus, 
the reduction in a firm’s bid-ask spread or cost of capital provided by management forecasts 
may not be significant enough to warrant the work required to provide such forecasts.  
Tests of the “Demand” Channel Explanation 
As previously discussed, prior research suggest that the capital market participants are 
likely to demand more information from derivatives users due to the increased economic and 
financial reporting complexity associated with derivatives (Campbell et al. 2015; Chang et al. 
                                                          
some derivatives were reported at fair value while others were reported at historical costs, leading to inconsistent accounting 
treatments over time. Second, because SFAS 133 standardized the hedge accounting criteria, more effective hedges qualified 
for hedge accounting after its adoption (Ahmed, Kilic, and Lobo 2011). For example, in the pre-SFAS 133 period, there was 
no authoritative guidance on whether or how “hedge accounting” should be applied for certain types of derivatives contracts, 
such as options (AICPA 1986). Third, hedge accounting under SFAS 133 reduces earnings volatility by allowing firms to 
record the gains/losses on both the derivatives and the hedged item in earnings in the same accounting period.  
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2016). We use three measures to identify firms that are likely to experience greater demand for 
managerial forecasts. First, following Chang et al. (2016), we classify firms based on whether 
they experience high or low economic complexity with respect to derivatives using data on the 
types of derivatives used. Second, we partition the sample based on analyst coverage. Given 
prior evidence that analysts demand information from managers (Balakrishnan et al. 2014) and 
that analysts do not understand the implications of derivatives (Chang et al. 2016), we expect 
a positive relation between analyst coverage and derivatives use if the demand channel exists. 
Lastly, we use institutional holdings as a substitute measure for analysts’ coverage. If the 
demand channel explains part of the positive association documented in H1, we expect the 
frequency of MEFs will be higher for firms with high economic complexity, firms with higher 
analyst following, and firms with higher institutional ownership:  
HYPOTHESIS 3: The frequency of MEFs is higher for users with more complex 
derivatives, high analyst coverage, and high institutional ownership. 
 
Similar to H2, there are forces that work against the “demand” hypotheses H3A, H3B, and 
H3C. First, if the market perceives derivatives to be complex, it is possible that they will 
demand disclosure directly related to derivatives rather than indirectly through MEFs. If so, 
the use of derivatives will have no impact on the MEFs. Second, although analysts with 
derivatives users show more forecast errors, the analysts may not realize exactly what they fail 
to understand. If so, analysts may not demand more information from derivatives users because 
the analysts are not aware that derivatives are the underlying driver of their forecast errors. If 
this is true, we may not observe demand channel effects.    
 
4. Research Design  
Research Design for H1 
We first test the association between the use of derivatives and the frequency of MEFs 
using the following negative binomial model:  
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where FREQit equals the number of annual earnings forecasts issued by firm i in year t and 
USERit equals 1 if firm i reports a position in derivatives in fiscal year t and 0 otherwise. We 
control for a set of variables that prior studies suggest as the factors that influence firms’ 
disclosure choices. Consistent with prior studies (Li 2010; Ali, Klasa, and Yeung 2014; Cao et 
al. 2017), we include institutional ownership (INST), market value of equity (SIZE), analyst 
following (FOL), and the market-to-book (MB) ratio. We also include audit firm size (BIGN) 
to capture whether a firm’s disclosure policy is heavily influenced by audit quality (Dunn and 
Mayhew 2004). Prior research (e.g., Skinner 1994; Healy and Palepu 2001) suggests that 
litigation risk and negative news affect disclosure choices because firms generally increase 
their disclosure when facing litigation risks from delayed disclosure about negative news. Thus, 
we include litigation risk (LITIGATION) and negative news (NEGNEWS). We also control for 
the volatility in earnings (ExPOST_EVOL) and abnormal returns (ABRETVOL) because they 
reflect the cost and effort of issuing forecasts (Waymire 1985).10 Finally, we include abnormal 
accruals (ABACC) to account for the relation between disclosure frequency and earnings 
management (Jo and Kim 2007). If H1 holds, the coefficient on USER should be positive after 
controlling for all of these variables (i.e., ψ1>0).  
Endogeneity 
A large concern in our study is that the firm characteristics may be correlated with both 
the use of derivatives and disclosure. To test our hypotheses H1A and H1B mitigating 
endogeneity, we use the focused setting of New Users (New Non-Users) and a difference-in-
differences design. Following Guay (1999) and Chang et al. (2016), we identify a subsample 
                                                          
10 Our argument is based on uncertainty regarding future earnings. The variable ExPOST_EVOL is based on the ex-post 
realization of earnings. When we exclude ExPOST_EVOL from our tests, the results are unchanged (and are, in fact, a bit 
stronger without ExPOST_EVOL). 
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of new derivatives users (new non-derivatives users). We use derivatives initiation 
(termination) as an event to examine the effect of derivatives on MEFs and address the concerns 
about correlated omitted variables. A firm is a New User (New Non-User) if the firm initiates 
(terminates) a derivatives position at some point between 1997 and 2012. We use the initiation 
(termination) year as the event year and perform difference-in-differences tests. The sample of 
New Users (New Non-Users) consists of 797 (430) firm observations (events).     
To account for the endogeneity in a firm’s decision to use derivatives, we use propensity 
score matching to identify a control group of Non-Users. We limit the potential control firms 
to those that do not use derivatives at any point during the sample period and then estimate the 
propensity of derivatives initiation (termination) using the probit model. In this probit model, 
we include risk management incentives that explain corporate use of derivatives.11 It includes 
exposures to interest rate (IRISK), foreign exchange rate (FRISK), and commodity price 
(CRISK) risks because surveys have shown that these are the risks most often managed with 
derivatives (Bodnar, Jong, and Macrae 2003). By insulating firm value and cash flow from 
unfavorable changes in risk exposure, derivatives can thwart financial distress (Mayers and 
Smith 1982), harmonize financing and investment goals (Froot et al. 1993), and reduce agency 
conflicts (Smith and Stulz 1985). We include the likelihood of financial distress (ALTZ), 
likelihood of underinvestment (USCORE), and the sensitivity of executive compensation to 
firm value (ECSENS) to capture these incentives. We also include the cash effective tax rate 
(CETR) to reflect the tax planning features of derivatives (Donohoe 2015). As derivatives 
substitutes, we control for convertible debt (CDEBT), preferred stock (PSTOCK), and 
abnormal accruals (ABACC). Lastly, the volatility of cash flow (ExPOST_CVOL) and earnings 
(ExPOST_EVOL) reflect other basic incentives for using derivatives (Zhang 2009). By 
                                                          
11 Our matching model includes risk management incentives given that the determinants of MEFs are not directly related to 
firms’ propensity to use derivatives. In unreported tests, we include all covariates in the matching model to match firms on as 
many relevant characteristics as possible, and the inferences from our study do not change.  
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including risk management incentives, the absence of derivatives among the potential Non-
User control firms reflects a choice not to use them, rather than no incentives to do so.  
 After matching New Users (New Non-Users) with Non-Users, we estimate the 
following two negative binomial models:  
0 1 2 3
1 1 ,
it i it it
x k t
x it k it t it it
x k t
FREQ NEWUSER POST NEWUSER POST
CTRL IND YR
   
    
     
    
                     (2) 
0 1 2
3 1 1 ,
it i it
x k t
it x it k it t it it
x k t
FREQ NEWNONUSER POST
NEWNONUSER POST CTRL IND YR
  
     
  
       
      (3) 
where NEWUSER (NEWNONUSER) equals 1 for New User (New Non-User) observations and 
0 for the control firm observations. POST is coded 1 for the post-treatment periods for New 
Users (New Non-Users) and the corresponding control firms (0 otherwise). The coefficient on 
NEWUSER (NEWNONUSER) captures the difference in the frequency of MEFs between New 
Users (New Non-Users) and the control firms before derivatives initiation (termination), and 
the coefficient on POST reflects the change in the frequency of MEFs among the control firms 
between the pre-and post-initiation (termination) periods. Thus, the coefficient on 
NEWUSER×POST (NEWNONUSER×POST) captures the effect of initiation (termination) on 
the frequency of management forecasts for New Users (New Non-Users) relative to Non-User 
control firms. If H1 holds, the coefficient on NEWUSER×POST should be positive (i.e., φ3>0) 
and/or the coefficient on NEWNONUSER×POST should be negative (i.e., ϕ3<0). 
Research Design for H2 
 To disentangle the supply and demand channels, we perform three sets of tests for each 
channel. We first test whether hedge accounting users are likely to issue more forecasts than 
non-hedge accounting users by replacing USER in Eq. (1) with HEDGE_USER and 
NONHEDGE_USER (H2A). HEDGE_USER equals 1 for User observations with non-missing 
and non-zero unrealized holding gains/losses from derivatives (0 otherwise), and 
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NONHEDGE_USER equals 1 for User observations with missing or zero unrealized holding 
gains/losses from derivatives (0 otherwise).12 If H2A holds, the coefficient of HEDGE_USER 
should be economically greater and statistically more significant than that of 
NONHEDGE_USER.  
To test H2B, we first classify New Users as effective or speculator/ineffective hedgers 
following Zhang (2009). We designate a New User as an effective derivatives user 
(speculator/ineffective hedgers) if the actual risk exposure is less than (equal to or greater than) 
expected after derivatives initiation. We then estimate Eq. (2) with two modifications. First, 
we replace NEWUSER with (1) an indicator variable equal to 1 for effective hedgers (0 
otherwise), and (2) an indicator variable equal to 1 for speculator/ineffective hedgers (0 
otherwise). Second, we interact these two variables with POST. If H2B holds, the coefficient 
on EH×POST should be economically greater and statistically more significant than that of 
SPIN×POST.  
Lastly, to test H2C, we modify Eq. (1) by replacing USER with two dummy variables, 
i.e., SFAS133 and HEDGE_USER. SFAS133 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for observations 
after the SFAS 133 effective date (fiscal-year June 2000) (0 otherwise); HEDGE_USER equals 
1 for User observations with non-missing and non-zero unrealized holding gains/losses from 
derivatives (0 otherwise). The interaction term between SFAS133 and HEDGE_USER 
indicates the effects of SFAS133 on the frequency of MEFs issued by hedge accounting users. 
We expect a positive coefficient on this interaction term (H2C).  
Research Design for H3 
                                                          
12 NONHEDGE_USER includes all users in the pre-SFAS 133 period and users in the post-SFAS 133 period who choose not 
to elect the hedge accounting option. The inclusion of users in the pre-SFAS 133 helps to control for omitted variables 
correlated with the decision to be hedge users. Moreover, limiting the sample to firms-years in the post-SFAS 133 period does 
not change the tenor of our results.   
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 As with H2, we conduct three sets of tests to investigate the demand channel. First, we 
partition the sample by the complexity of the derivatives. We designate firm-years with at least 
two types of derivatives instruments as a sample of high derivatives complexity and the others 
as low complexity (Chang et al. 2016). Next, we partition the sample by analyst following and 
institutional ownership, respectively. If H3 holds, the coefficient on USER should be 
economically larger and statistically more significant in the subsample of firms with more 
complex derivatives, high analyst following, and high institutional ownership relative to the 
subsample of firms with less complex derivatives, lower analyst following, and lower 
institutional ownership.  
 
5. Results 
Sample Selection and Descriptive statistics 
We collect data from the intersection of the Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S databases. 
We start with firms that issue MEFs between 1997 and 2012, resulting in 37,286 firm-year 
observations. We then retain observations with necessary stock market and accounting data 
available from Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S. The firms in this final sample also meet the 
following criteria: (1) publicly traded; (2) domestically incorporated; (3) non-financial/non-
regulated industry; and (4) non-subsidiary. Finally, we merge this filtered sample with the data 
on corporate derivatives. Following Manconi, Massa, and Zhang (2017), we collect corporate 
derivatives information from annual filings using a keyword search through the SeekEdgar 
database. 13  Although we closely follow their data collection procedure, we significantly 
expanded their list of keywords. Some of the keywords/phrases we added to our search 
included “derivatives,” “derivative contracts,” “derivative instruments,” “cash flow hedge 
                                                          
13 Not all SEC filings by public companies were available on EDGAR. Firms were phased into EDGAR filing over a three-
year period, ending May 6, 1996. As of that date, all public domestic companies were required to submit their filings via 
EDGAR. 
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accounting,” and “designated as a hedge.” To identify derivatives users, we restrict our 
attention to observations with derivatives-related keywords/phrases in their annual reports (10-
K, 10-K/A, 10-K405, 10-K405/A, 10-KT405, 10-KT405/A). If an amendment was filed during 
a period, we use the annual report that had the highest number of derivatives-related keywords. 
We also distinguish between foreign exchange (FX), interest rate (IR), and commodity price 
(CP) users. We classify firms as FX/IR/CP users if the filings contained at least three instances 
of keywords associated with FX/IR/CP derivatives use (Manconi et al. 2017). We further 
classify a firm as a derivatives user if it was initially classified as an FX/IR/CP user or if it had 
20 or more derivatives-related keywords. Our final sample consists of 21,880 firm-year 
observations with 9,721 User and 12,159 Non-User firm-year observations. This sample 
represents 2,123 unique firms, of whom 797 (430) initiated (terminated) a derivatives program 
and are thus classified as New Users (New Non-Users). 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the Users and Non-Users samples. Panel A 
reports the sample selection criteria detailed above. Panel B presents the temporal distribution 
of the sample. Consistent with prior studies, we observe an increase in the use of derivatives 
around 2001, the year SFAS 133 was adopted. Panel C illustrates the industry distribution of 
Users and Non-Users. Overall, firms from the business equipment and manufacturing 
industries comprise the largest proportion. Thus, following prior studies on derivatives and 
MEFs, we control for industry and year fixed-effects.  
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics. Panels A and B report that the mean (median) 
MEF is 2.009 (1.000). However, consistent with H1, the frequency of MEFs is significantly 
higher for Users (2.562) than Non-Users (1.566). Further, derivatives users have higher analyst 
following, higher institutional ownership, and are larger than non-users. Studies show that 
abnormal accruals can be a factor in explaining corporate disclosure policy. However, we do 
not observe a significant difference in abnormal accruals between Users and Non-Users. Panel 
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C of Table 2 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation. A consistently positive pattern can 
be observed between USER and MEF_FREQ in both correlations. In addition, we do not 
observe any flipped sign between the two correlations, indicating a low concern for outliers.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the covariate balance between New Users and the Non-Users 
control firms, while Panel B of Table 3 reports the covariate balance between New Non-Users 
and the Non-Users control firms. If the covariates are balanced, then the differences in the 
frequency of managerial earnings forecasts can be attributed to derivatives initiation 
(termination) rather than other firm characteristics. We report the p-values from the tests of the 
differences in means (t-tests), medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests), and distributions 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) of the risk management incentives between New Users and Non-
Users (Panel A) and New Non-Users and Non-Users (Panel B). Propensity score matching does 
not require matched firms to be identical across all covariates (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
Of the 13 variables, only two are statistically dissimilar at the 90% confidence level (ECSENS 
and ABACC in Panel A and ALTZ and EV in Panel B). When all of the covariates are considered 
together, the Hotelling’s 𝑇2 tests (p=0.920 in Panel A and p=0.566 in Panel B) indicate that 
New Users and New Non-Users are not different from the control firms. Overall, Table 3 shows 
that our matching process was successful.  
Relation between Derivatives Use and MEFs (H1) 
We first test the relation between firms’ use of derivatives and the likelihood that 
managers issue a MEF using the entire sample of derivatives Users and Non-Users (Eq. [1]), 
as well as the more focused settings of New Users (Eq. [2]) and New Non-Users (Eq. [3]). We 
predict that MEFs will be positively associated with derivatives use and will be higher (lower) 
after the initiation (termination) of a derivatives program. Table 4 presents the estimates of Eq. 
[1] and the formal test of H1 using our entire sample of Users and Non-Users. Consistent with 
our prediction, we observe a positive association between derivatives use and the frequency of 
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MEFs. The coefficient on our variable of interest, USER, is positive and significant (0.115), 
with a p-value less than 0.01.14 The frequency of MEFs is also higher for firms that are larger 
and firms that have higher institutional ownership and lower earnings volatility (Waymire 
1985; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005; Baik, Farber, and Lee 2011).  
Next, we examine the relation between derivatives use and MEFs in the more focused 
settings of derivatives initiation and termination and use a difference-in-differences design to 
alleviate concerns about potential correlated omitted variables. Panels A and B of Table 5 
present estimates of Eq. [2] and [3]. The coefficient on NEWUSER×POST is positive and 
significant in Panel A and negative and significant in Panel B. We do not have a prediction on 
the change in control firms’ disclosure policies (i.e., the coefficient on POST).15 Nonetheless, 
the results suggest that relative to control firms, the frequency of MEFs is greater for New 
Users and lower for New Non-Users after initiation and termination, respectively. The 
insignificant coefficients for New Users (New Non-Users) suggest there is no difference 
between New Users (New Non-Users) and the control groups prior to initiation (termination). 
Overall, the evidence from our tests of H1 suggests that derivatives users issue more MEFs.  
To gauge the economic magnitude of the effect of derivatives initiation (termination) 
on MEFs, we estimate the percentage change in FREQ for New Users (New Non-Users) after 
initiation (termination) by calculating the marginal effect of POST on FREQ for New Users 
(New Non-Users). This marginal effect indicates how the FREQ of New Users (New Non-
Users) changes as POST changes from 0 to 1, holding other variables constant. The ratio of the 
marginal effect of POST to its pre-initiation (termination) value (i.e., POST=0) estimates the 
                                                          
14 To estimate the economic magnitude, we compare the coefficient of USER with that of INST. For this comparison, we 
convert INST into a binary variable that equals 1 (0) for high (low) institutional ownership based on the median value of INST. 
In the negative binomial model, we interpret the regression coefficient as the change in the natural log of expected counts of 
the response variable for a one-unit change in the predictor variable. The (unreported) results indicate that the coefficients on 
USER and INST are very similar, which implies that the effects of USER on the frequency of MEFs are economically large 
enough to be comparable with that of INST. 
15 Baginski and Hinson (2016) suggest that control firms may decrease their forecasting when their peer firms provide more 
forecasts because the control firms can free ride on their peers benefitting from the information transfer among them. However, 
it is also possible that the control firms experience no change in forecasts, thus leading to an insignificant coefficient on POST. 
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relative percentage change in FREQ for New Users (New Non-Users) after initiation 
(termination). The ratios indicate that relative to Non-User control firms, New Users (New Non-
Users) experience a 24.28% increase (21.58% decrease) in the frequency of MEFs (on average) 
after derivatives initiation (termination). The economic magnitude analysis indicates that our 
results are both statistically and economically significant.  
The “Supply” Channel (H2) 
To examine whether our results are driven by the supply or the demand channels, we 
perform additional tests. H2 tests the supply channel and predicts that the positive association 
between the use of derivatives and MEFs is driven by a lower cost of supplying forecasts for 
derivatives users. If the supply channel holds, we expect the frequency of MEFs to be higher 
for hedge accounting users (H2A), effective hedgers (H2B), and hedge accounting users in the 
post-SFAS 133 period (H2C) because these derivatives users have lower earnings uncertainty. 
As noted, we classify Users as hedge accounting users and non-hedge accounting users based 
on the reported amount of accumulated gains/losses for derivatives in the cash flow hedges. 
We also classify New Users as effective or speculator/ineffective hedgers based on the 
difference between the actual and expected risk exposure after initiation. Finally, SFAS 133 is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-year observations after the adoption of SFAS 133. In 
Panel A of Table 6 we regress HEDGE_USER and NON_HEDGE_USER on the frequency of 
MEFs. Among 9,721 User observations, 3,294 (6,427) are classified as hedge accounting user 
(non-hedge accounting user) observations. Consistent with H2A, the coefficient on 
HEDGE_USER (0.190) is positive and significant and a Wald Test of the difference between 
the coefficients on HEDGE_USER and NONHEDGE_USER confirms that the coefficient on 
HEDGE_USER is statistically larger than the coefficient on NONHEDGE_USER.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports the association between the frequency of MEFs and New 
Users that are effective hedgers (EH) and speculator/ineffective hedgers (SPIN) before and 
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after initiation relative to a matched control sample. Among 797 New Users, 657 (140) firms 
are classified as EH (SPIN) firms. The coefficient on NEWUSER_EH×POST is positive and 
significant but the coefficient on the interaction term NEWUSER_SPIN×POST is insignificant, 
suggesting that the frequency of MEFs is higher after initiation only for firms that are effective 
derivatives users (H2B).  
Finally, in Panel C we examine the impact of SFAS 133 on the frequency of MEFs. 
Although firms used hedge accounting before and after SFAS 133, we expect earnings to be 
easier to forecast for hedge accounting users in the post SFAS 133 period because (1) more 
effective hedges qualify for hedge accounting after SFAS 133; (2) more instruments qualify 
for hedge accounting after SFAS 133; and (3) hedge accounting after SFAS 133 was designed 
to minimize the earnings volatility for these highly effective hedges. In the first column, we 
use a sample of firms that use hedge accounting after SFAS 133 and expect a positive 
association between the adoption of SFAS 133 and the frequency of MEFs for this sample of 
hedge accounting users. In the second column, we expand the sample to hedge accounting users 
and non-hedge accounting users and expect the impact of SFAS 133 to be stronger for the 
hedge accounting users. The results in both columns show a positive association between the 
adoption of SFAS 133 and the frequency of MEFs, and the coefficient on the interaction term 
SFAS133×HEDGE_USER is positive and significant in the second column (0.292).  
These results are consistent with the idea that hedge accounting under SFAS 133 
reduces earnings uncertainty by resolving the timing mismatch issues between the derivatives 
and the hedged items for hedge accounting users. Our results in Panel C have implications for 
the debate over SFAS 133. Although numerous parties have expressed concerns about the 
complexity imposed by SFAS 133, our results shed light on the positive effects of SFAS 133 
on disclosure. Overall, the results in Table 6 support the supply channel that the use of 
derivatives reduces the cost of supplying MEFs by reducing the future earnings uncertainty. 
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The “Demand” Channel (H3) 
Next, we test the demand channel and examine whether the frequency of MEFs is 
higher for derivatives users that may experience higher investor and analyst demand for MEFs 
due to their use of derivatives (firms with more complex derivatives, higher analyst following, 
or higher institutional ownership). In Panel A of Table 7 we find that the coefficients on USER 
are not significantly different for firms with low and high derivatives complexity. In Panel B, 
we find that the coefficients on USER are not statistically different between Users with low 
and high analyst following. Similarly, in Panel C, we find that the coefficients on USER are 
not statistically different between firms with high and low institutional ownership. Overall, our 
results in Table 7 fail to provide support for the demand channel.16  
Highly complex derivatives can increase managers’ perceived risk of forecasting 
because the managers are not experts in handling derivatives, which thus prevents them from 
issuing more forecasts even in the presence of investor demand. We acknowledge that the lack 
of a significant finding in Table 7 does not refute the demand channel argument and may be 
attributable to other factors, such as omitted variables correlated with our proxies for the 
demand channel. In untabulated tests, we use the pre-SFAS 161 period as another proxy for 
the investor demand for disclosure because there are fewer mandatory disclosure requirements 
for derivatives in pre-SFAS 161 as opposed to the post-SFAS 161 period.17 If the demand 
channel exists, we should observe that users issue more MEFs in the pre-SFAS 161 period than 
post-SFAS 161 period. Consistent with our earlier finding, we do not observe that firms issue 
more MEFs in pre-SFAS 161 than post-SFAS 161 and fail to support the demand channel.  
                                                          
16 In Table 7, we use the full interaction model (split-sample analysis), and our results are robust to the partial interaction 
model. In Panel B of Table 6, we choose a partial interaction model because we need to follow the design of the initiation 
(termination) of users. 
17 Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 161 (SFAS 161), Disclosures about Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities, is an accounting standard issued in March 2008 by the FASB. This standard amended and significantly expanded 
the disclosure requirements of SFAS No. 133, with the intention of providing users of financial statements with an enhanced 
understanding of why an entity uses derivatives instruments, and how such instruments and hedge items are accounted for and 
impact financial statements. SFAS 161 is now codified under ASC 815.  
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Additional Tests 
Forecasts Other than Earnings 
In untabulated analyses, we investigate whether the type of underlying asset affects 
disclosure decisions. We predict that foreign currency hedgers are more likely to issue sales 
forecasts than interest rate hedgers because hedging foreign currency risk on the revenue side 
makes forecasting sales easier for managers. However, interest rate hedging should not have a 
significant impact on sales uncertainty because the gains/losses on interest rate derivatives are 
commonly included in interest income/expenses. Consistent with the supply channel argument, 
we find a positive association between foreign exchange hedgers and the frequency of 
management sales forecasts.  
Alternative Attributes for Voluntary Disclosure Quality 
In addition to the frequency of MEFs, the use of derivatives could also affect other 
properties of MEFs such as their timeliness, precision, and accuracy. In untabulated results, we 
find a positive and significant association between the use of derivatives and precision and 
accuracy, suggesting that derivatives users are more likely to make forecast point estimates and 
have higher forecast accuracy. However, we do not find a statistically significant association 
between the use of derivatives and timeliness. Our findings show that managers do not only 
increase the frequency of their disclosure but issue more informative disclosures. Overall, the 
results of these supplemental tests are consistent with the supply channel argument.   
Correlated Omitted Variables  
New derivatives users typically state in their 10-K that they initiate derivatives 
programs to eliminate the variability of cash flows in interest payments, to manage the currency 
risk resulting from purchase and sale commitments denominated in foreign currencies, and/or 
to mitigate the exposure to volatile commodities (e.g., copper, natural gas). Derivatives 
initiation can occur simultaneously with a structural change in a firm’s risk exposure. For 
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example, some New Users in our sample (approximately 20%) experience an increase in their 
credit facility or acquire foreign subsidiaries when they begin using derivatives.  
To confirm that derivatives initiation, and not structural changes in a firm’s risk 
exposure, influences the frequency of MEFs, we identify three situations in which a firm is 
likely to experience risk exposure shocks. First, we consider firm-years with an increased debt 
ratio to have high exposure to interest rate risk, and low otherwise. Specifically, the firms in 
the top three (bottom two) quintiles of risk exposure shock are designated as a high (low) shock 
partition. Second, we also consider firms with foreign income or a foreign subsidiary to have 
high exposure to foreign exchange rate risk, and low otherwise. Finally, we regard firms in the 
commodity industry (e.g., grain, pork, coal, gold, and gas) to have high exposure to commodity 
price risk, and low exposure otherwise. After partitioning the sample into high and low risk 
exposure shocks, we redo the analysis in Panel A of Table 5. For interest rate risk exposure, 
we find that the effects of initiation on the frequency of MEFs are significant for both the high 
and low shock partitions, although there is no difference between the partitions (unreported). 
For foreign risk exposure and commodity price risk exposure, the coefficient for 
NEWUSER×POST is significant only for firms that experience low risk exposure shocks 
(unreported). Overall, these results suggest that derivatives initiation, rather than risk exposure 
shocks, increases the frequency of MEFs.   
Firm and Manager Fixed Effects  
In our primary tests, we use a difference-in-differences research design that includes 
several control variables and industry and year fixed effects. To further mitigate the likelihood 
that our results are explained by a time-invariant, correlated omitted variable, in an untabulated 
analysis, we use firm fixed effects in place of industry fixed effects.  
To investigate whether managerial traits drive our results, we include manager fixed 
effects and find all results are robust. Our SFAS 133 test (Table 6 Panel C) further addresses 
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the issue from managerial traits. Because SFAS 133 introduces an exogenous shock to firms’ 
earnings volatility, such change in earnings volatility does not result from managers’ decisions. 
Overall, the evidence supports that our results are robust to manager and firm fixed effects.    
 
6. Conclusion 
We examine whether and how the corporate use of derivatives influences the frequency 
of MEFs. Using a hand-collected sample of 21,880 firm-year observations of derivatives users 
and non-users, we find that derivatives users are likely to issue more earnings forecasts than 
non-users. Furthermore, we find that the frequency of MEFs increases (decreases) for firms 
that begin (stop) using derivatives after derivatives initiation (termination) relative to non-
users. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the positive association between the use of derivatives 
and MEFs is stronger for firms that apply hedge accounting and are effective hedgers and is 
more pronounced in the post-SFAS 133 period, which is consistent with the argument that 
firms’ risk management activities make it easier for managers to forecast earnings. However, 
we do not find any evidence to support that a higher frequency of MEFs for derivatives users 
is driven by the information demands resulting from the complexity of derivatives.  
A limitation of our study is that a firm’s decision to forecast earnings may be correlated 
with its risk management incentives. Nevertheless, our difference-in-differences tests provide 
consistent support for our findings after controlling for all known risk management incentives 
by propensity score matching. Our hand-collected data on derivatives initiation reasons and 
additional analyses further provide corroborating evidence that our main results are driven by 
the use of derivatives rather than concurrent risk exposure shocks.  
This study focuses on earnings guidance because the use of derivatives heavily affects 
future earnings, and the market does not understand such impacts (Campbell et al. 2015; Chang 
et al. 2016). However, the effects of derivatives on firms’ disclosure decisions might vary with 
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their choices of disclosure channels (e.g., social media, conference calls). Future research may 
wish to examine how and why firm disclosure channels other than MEFs are affected by 
derivatives use. In addition, because there is no consensus on how to proxy for proprietary 
costs in the context of derivatives, it may also be interesting for future studies to develop a 
proprietary cost measure and examine how it interacts with derivatives and disclosure policy.   
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Appendix A 
Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variables 
 
FREQ Management earnings forecast frequency, defined as the number of annual 
earnings forecasts issued by firm i in year t.  
 
 
Variables of interest 
 
USER Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a position in derivatives in fiscal 
year t; 0 if the firm does not report a position in derivatives.  
 
NEWUSER   Indicator variable equal to 1 for all New User firm observations and 0 for all 
matched control firm observations.   
 
NEWNONUSER Indicator variable equal to 1 for all New Non-User firm observations and 0 for 
all matched control firm observations.   
 
HEDGE_USER Indicator variable equal to 1 for User observations with non-missing and non-
zero unrealized holding gain/loss from derivatives; 0 otherwise. 
 
NONHEDGE_USER Indicator variable equal to 1 for User observations with missing or zero 
unrealized holding gain/loss from derivatives; 0 otherwise. 
 
EH Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm effectively hedges (reduces) its 
exposure to at least two risks (interest rate (IRISK), foreign exchange rate 
(FRISK), or commodity price (CRISK) risks) relative to expectations after 
derivatives initiation; 0 otherwise. See Zhang (2009) for details. 
 
POST Indicator variable equal to 1 for both New User (New Non-User) and matched 
control firm observations in periods after derivatives initiation (termination); 
0 otherwise. 
           
Disclosure determinants  
 
INST  Institutional ownership for firm i at end of year t. 
 
SIZE Log of equity market value (prcc_f×csho) at end of year t. 
 
FOL Number of analysts following firm i in year t.  
 
BIGN Indicator variable for Big N auditors.   
 
LITIGATION Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to an industry with a high 
incidence of litigation; 0 otherwise. See Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 
(1994) for details.  
 
MB Market to book ratio, defined as equity market value (prcc_f×csho) divided by 
book value of equity (at−lt−pstkl+txditc+dcvt) at end of year t. 
 
NEGNEWS Indicator variable for negative earnings news for firm i in year t.   
 
ExPOST_EVOL Ex-post earnings volatility, defined as the standard deviation of quarterly 
earnings before extraordinary items (ibq) during the most recent two years. 
 
ABRETVOL Abnormal return volatility, defined as the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns (adjusted for industry average) for firm i at year t.  
ABACC Abnormal accruals, based on the performance-matched modified Jones model. 
 
Risk management incentives  
 
IRISK Interest rate risk exposures, defined as the absolute value of the estimated 
coefficient from a regression of firms’ monthly holding period stock returns 
on the monthly percentage change in the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) for 24 months prior to fiscal-year end. See Guay (1999), Zhang 
(2009), and Donohoe (2015). 
 
FRISK Foreign currency exchange rate risk exposures, defined as the absolute value 
of the estimated coefficient from a regression of firms’ monthly holding period 
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stock returns on the monthly percentage change in the Federal Reserve Board 
trade-weighted U.S. dollar index for 24 months prior to fiscal-year end. See 
Guay (1999), Zhang (2009), and Donohoe (2015). 
 
CRISK Commodity price risk exposures, defined as the absolute value of the estimated 
coefficient from a regression of firms’ monthly holding period stock returns 
on the monthly percentage change in the Producer Price Index for 24 months 
prior to fiscal-year end. See Guay (1999), Zhang (2009), and Donohoe (2015). 
 
ALTZ Likelihood of entering financial distress, defined as the modified Altman-Z 
score based on parameter weights reported by Shumway (2001).   
 
USCORE Likelihood of underinvestment, defined by first ranking cash flow from 
operations (oancf), debt-to-assets ratio (lt/at), and scores from a factor analysis 
of four growth opportunity measures (prior investment activity, geometric 
growth in market value of assets, market-to-book ratio, and research and 
development into deciles by year and industry. Decile ranks for debt-to-asset 
ratios and growth opportunity factor scores are then added to the reverse decile 
rank for cash flow from operations, with the result scaled by 30 (total possible 
points). See Donohoe (2015). 
 
ECSENS Sensitivity of executive compensation to firm value, defined by first computing 
the dollar change in value of CEO stock and option holdings that would result 
from a one percentage point increase in the stock price of the firm (0.01 × 
prcc_f × [shrown_tot + opt_unex_exer_num]). The result is then normalized 
by the sum of CEO salary and bonus (salary + bonus) to capture the share of 
total CEO compensation that would result from a one percentage point increase 
in firm value. Compensation data obtained from Execucomp. See Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006).    
CETR Cash effective tax rate (3-year), defined as the three-year sum (t to t+2) of 
worldwide cash taxes paid (txpd) divided by the three-year sum (t to t+2) of 
pre-tax book income (pi) less special items (spi). ETRs are reset to 1 (0) if 
greater (less) than 1 (0). See Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008). 
 
CDEBT Convertible debt, defined as convertible debt (dcvt) divided by lagged total 
assets (at). 
 
PSTOCK Preferred stock, defined as preferred stock (pstk) divided by lagged total assets 
(at). 
 
ExPOST_CVOL Cash flow volatility, defined as the standard deviation of quarterly operating 
cash flows (oancfy, adjusted to reflect quarterly data) during the most recent 
two years.  
 
Other variable 
 
SFAS133 Indicator variable equal to 1 for observations after fiscal-year June 2000; 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
    aCompustat mnemonics in parentheses.  
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Appendix B 
In the following two examples, assume that a firm has revenue of $4 and COGS of $2. 
Revenue is constant over the next few years, the firm sells only one product, and taxes are 
ignored. In year t, the firm hedges its inventory purchase in year t+1. After the hedge is in 
place, the price of inventory goes up by $1 from $2 to $3.  
 
Example 1 (hedge accounting vs. fair value accounting) 
This example illustrates how the accounting for derivatives helps managers forecast 
earnings. In year t, the firm has COGS of $2 (purchased at the old price). If the firm uses cash 
flow hedge accounting, the $1 gain from the change in fair value of the derivatives is recorded 
in AOCI. In year t+1, the firm benefits from the hedge. It purchases inventory at $3 and 
reclassifies the $1 gain from AOCI to earnings. Thus, COGS is $2 in year t+1 again. On the 
other hand, if a firm uses fair value accounting, the $1 gain on derivatives is recognized in year 
t. Therefore, COGS is $1 in year t ($2 purchase of inventory less $1 gain on derivatives). In 
year t+1, the firm purchases inventory at $3. Since the gain on the derivatives was already 
recognized in year t, there is no offsetting effect and COGS is $3. Compared to fair value 
accounting, hedge accounting can help managers predict earnings. 
 
Example 2 (effective hedgers vs. speculator/ineffective hedgers) 
This example illustrates how the use of derivatives that are effective hedges of the 
underlying exposure helps managers forecast earnings. As in Example 1, assume that the firm 
uses cash flow hedge accounting. Further assume that as the price of inventory increases by $1, 
the fair value of the derivatives increases by only 80 cents (the firm only hedges 80% of its 
exposure to inventory price changes) and this gain is recorded in AOCI. In year t+1, the firm 
benefits from the hedge. It purchases inventory at $3 and reclassifies the 80 cent gain from 
AOCI to earnings. Thus, COGS is $2.20 in year t+1. If instead the firm hedges 100% of its 
exposure, as in Example 1, COGS is $2 in years t and t+1. It is easier for managers to predict 
earnings when the hedge ratio is higher (100% vs. 80%).  
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Table 1    
Characteristics of Users and Non-Users 
 
Panel A: Sample selection   
  Obs. 
Firms that issue at least one earnings forecast from 1997 to 2012 (2,633 firms)  37,286 
Less:    
  Observations with missing necessary information to calculate variables   10,710 
Observations in financial and regulated industries (SIC 4400-4999 and 6000- 
6999) 
 4,620 
Observations with missing corporate derivatives information (derivatives users  
are defined by performing a keyword search through annual reports) 
 
76 
Final Sample   21,880 
 
Panel B: Temporal distribution of sample observations  
  Users  Non-Users 
Year     Obs. %     Obs. % 
1997  213 2  660 5 
1998  398 4  861 7 
1999  463 5  920 8 
2000  521 5  942 8 
2001  652 7  873 7 
2002  681 7  844 7 
2003  711 7  782 6 
2004  689 7  807 7 
2005  681 7  798 7 
2006  665 7  806 7 
2007  666 7  745 6 
2008  684 7  694 6 
2009  692 7  658 5 
2010  691 7  606 5 
2011  662 7  594 5 
2012  652 7  569 5 
Total  9,721   12,159  
 
Panel C: Industry distribution of sample observations  
  Users  Non-Users        
Industry group  Obs. %  Obs. %        
Consumer Non-Durables  938 10  715 6        
Consumer Durables  411 4  403 3        
Manufacturing  1,699 17  1,160 10        
Energy & Extraction  276 3  311 3        
Chemicals & Allied Products  531 5  172 1        
Business Equipment  1,845 19  3,236 27        
Telecommunications  222 2  218 2        
Wholesale & Retail  1,551 16  2,016 17        
Healthcare  911 9  1,822 15        
Constr., Transport. & Services  1,337 14  2,106 17        
  Total  9,721   12,159  
       
This table presents characteristics of Users and Non-Users. Panel A presents the sample selection procedure, 
Panel B illustrates the temporal distribution of sample observations, and Panel C reports the industry 
distribution of the sample. Users are identified by performing a keyword search in annual fillings. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
  Mean  Std.dev  Q1  Median  Q3 
  FREQ  2.009   2.525   0.000   1.000   4.000  
  INST  0.541   0.350   0.221   0.629   0.841  
  SIZE  6.693   1.782   5.484   6.595   7.833  
  FOL  10.139   8.301   4.000   8.000   14.000  
  BIGN  0.906   0.292   1.000   1.000   1.000  
  LITIGATION  0.355   0.479   0.000   0.000   1.000  
  MB  2.650    3.462   1.057   1.853   3.202  
  NEGNEWS  0.390   0.488   0.000   0.000   1.000  
  ExPOST_EVOL  0.023   0.050   0.005   0.010   0.023  
  ABRETVOL  0.125   0.073   0.074   0.107   0.154  
  ABACC  −0.015   0.138   −0.067   −0.002   0.044  
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics partitioned by Users and Non-Users 
  (1)  (2)   
  Users  Non-Users   
  Mean Median  Mean  Median  t-stat [(1)−(2)] 
  FREQ  2.562  2.000   1.566   0.000  28.85  
  INST  0.597  0.715   0.497   0.548  21.34  
  SIZE  7.386  7.332   6.140   6.079  54.42  
  FOL  12.051  10.000   8.612   6.000  30.44  
  BIGN  0.944  1.000   0.875   1.000  17.99  
  LITIGATION  0.288  0.000   0.409   0.000  −18.97  
  MB  2.512  1.778   2.760   1.928  −5.26  
  NEGNEWS  0.384  0.000   0.394   0.000  −1.63  
  ExPOST_EVOL  0.017  0.008   0.029   0.013  −18.74  
  ABRETVOL  0.107  0.092   0.140   0.121  −34.43  
  ABACC  −0.016  −0.005   −0.014   0.000  −0.78  
Obs.  9,721  12,159   
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Panel C: Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations  
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) USER   0.196 0.143 0.348 0.206 0.116 −0.126 −0.036 −0.011 −0.118 −0.222 −0.005 
(2) FREQ  0.184  0.150 0.312 0.214 0.065 0.006 0.019 −0.045 −0.112 −0.260 −0.017 
(3) INST  0.147 0.155  0.255 0.159 0.077 −0.127 0.033 −0.028 −0.090 −0.202 −0.029 
(4) SIZE  0.353 0.290 0.284  0.716 0.241 0.025 0.208 −0.150 −0.202 −0.436 −0.037 
(5) FOL  0.218 0.247 0.259 0.742   0.166 0.171 0.123 −0.039 −0.057 −0.216 −0.050 
(6) BIGN  0.116 0.067 0.083 0.244 0.192  0.013 0.020 −0.020 −0.033 −0.048 −0.009 
(7) LITIGATION  −0.126 0.006 −0.118 0.010 0.130 0.013  0.075 0.004 0.074 0.132 −0.021 
(8) MB  −0.054 0.070 0.065 0.284 0.175 0.023 0.092  −0.111 0.030 0.015 −0.052 
(9) NEGNEWS  −0.011 −0.028 −0.030 −0.153 −0.045 −0.020 0.004 −0.181  0.073 0.081 −0.051 
(10) ExPOST_EVOL  −0.200 −0.181 −0.171 −0.326 −0.162 −0.085 0.165 −0.005 0.186  0.326 −0.082 
(11) ABRETVOL  −0.247 −0.270 −0.211 −0.500 −0.273 −0.071 0.129 −0.103 0.101 0.442  −0.024 
(12) ABACC  −0.012 −0.030 −0.033 −0.050 −0.054 −0.016 −0.020 −0.052 −0.053 −0.057 −0.014  
This table reports descriptive statistics for Users and Non-Users. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the entire sample and Panel B reports summary statistics 
for Users and Non-Users along with t-statistics for mean tests of differences between those two groups. Panel C presents the Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman 
(below diagonal) correlations for the variables in the main analyses. Bold t-statistics denote statistical significance at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
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Table 3  
Covariate balance for matched sample 
 
Panel A: New User sample 
 New Users / Non-Users  
 
Mean 
Diff. 
 
 
Median 
Diff.  
Dist.  
Diff. 
 
 p-value  p-value  p-value  
Risk management incentives   
 IRISK 0.918  0.165  0.269  
 FRISK 0.402  0.586  0.668  
 CRISK 0.669  0.312  0.243  
 ALTZ 0.514  0.999  0.964  
 USCORE 0.809  0.677  0.895  
 ECSENS 0.425    0.063*        0.019**  
 CETR 0.616  0.513  0.464  
 CDEBT 0.194  0.558  0.999  
 PSTOCK 0.452  0.302  0.997  
 ABACC 0.811  0.292        0.010**  
 ExPOST_CVOL 0.983  0.664  0.243  
 ExPOST_EVOL 0.981  0.973  0.922  
 SIZE 0.363  0.283  0.100  
   Hotelling’s T2    0.920    
 
 
 
     
Panel B: New Non-User sample 
 New Non-Users / Non-Users         
 
Mean 
Diff. 
 
 
Median 
Diff.  
Dist.  
Diff. 
       
 p-value  p-value  p-value        
Risk management incentives         
 IRISK 0.460  0.738  0.684        
 FRISK 0.304  0.323  0.185        
 CRISK 0.561  0.584  0.741        
 ALTZ 0.396      0.033**    0.058*        
 USCORE 0.705  0.882  0.989        
 ECSENS 0.342  0.568  0.927        
 CETR 0.853  0.853  0.741        
 CDEBT 0.928  0.853  0.795        
 PSTOCK 0.965  0.746  1.000        
 ABACC 0.380  0.694  0.684        
 ExPOST_CVOL 0.764  0.894  0.846        
 ExPOST_EVOL       0.004***      0.039**  0.136        
 SIZE 0.523  0.946  0.846        
   Hotelling’s T2    0.566          
This table presents the covariate balance between the 797 New Users (430 New Non-Users) and propensity 
score matched control firms (Non-Users) in the match year. Reported values are p-values for tests of 
differences in means (t-tests), medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test), and distributions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
homogeneous distributions test) of risk management incentives. Hotelling’s T2 test is the multivariate 
equivalent of the two-sample t-test and considers whether the vector of all variable means differ between the 
two groups. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-
tailed). Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4 
Derivatives use and the frequency of management earnings forecasts  
 
  FREQ     
  Coeff.  RSE     
  USER                                        
Ψ1 
 0.115 *** 0.030     
  INST  0.206 *** 0.049     
  SIZE  0.148 *** 0.014     
  FOL  0.004  0.003     
  BIGN  0.052  0.059     
  LITIGATION  0.053  0.047     
  MB  −0.007 ** 0.004     
  NEGNEWS  0.022  0.018     
  ExPOST_EVOL  −1.741 *** 0.374     
  ABRETVOL  −1.581 *** 0.233     
  ABACC  −0.144 ** 0.070     
       Industry FE  Yes     
Year FE Yes     
R2 0.06     
Wald χ2 (model) 3,059.43***     
Observations 21,880     
This table reports tests of whether firms’ use of derivatives increases the likelihood that managers provide 
an earnings forecast, where the dependent variable is FREQ. USER equals 1 if firm i reports a position in 
derivatives in year t (0 otherwise). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Robust standard errors (RSE) are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). Variables 
are defined in Appendix A.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
 
 
Table 5 
Difference-in-differences tests of management earnings forecasts  
 
Panel A: New User sample  
       FREQ  
  Coeff.  RSE  
  NEWUSER                                        
Ψ1 
−0.089  0.068  
  POST  −0.164 ** 0.066  
  NEWUSER×POST                                        0.184 ** 0.076  
  INST  0.228 *** 0.062  
  SIZE  0.168 *** 0.018  
  FOL  0.000  0.003  
  BIGN  0.090  0.084  
  LITIGATION  0.076  0.060  
  MB  −0.011 ** 0.005  
  NEGNEWS  0.029  0.022  
  ExPOST_EVOL  −1.035 *** 0.382  
  ABRETVOL  −2.227 *** 0.313  
  ABACC  −0.079  0.093  
    Industry FE  Yes  
Year FE Yes  
R2 0.06  
Wald χ2 (model) 2,009.98***  
Observations 13,591  
 
Panel B: New Non-User sample      
  FREQ  
  Coeff.  RSE  
  NEWNONUSER                                        
Ψ1 
 0.043  0.066  
  POST                                          0.151 * 0.088  
  NEWNONUSER×POST                                         −0.230 ** 0.100  
  INST  0.237 *** 0.082  
  SIZE  0.171 *** 0.025  
  FOL  0.005  0.005  
  BIGN  0.036  0.096  
  LITIGATION  0.145 * 0.083  
  MB  −0.002  0.007  
  NEGNEWS  0.008  0.030  
  ExPOST_EVOL  −2.286 *** 0.674  
  ABRETVOL  −2.055 *** 0.446  
  ABACC  −0.205 * 0.125  
    Industry FE  Yes  
Year FE Yes  
R2 0.06  
Wald χ2 (model) 1,100.83***  
Observations 7,278  
This table reports tests of whether derivatives initiation (termination) increases (decreases) the likelihood 
that managers provide an earnings forecast, where the dependent variable is FREQ. NEWUSER 
(NEWNONUSER) equals 1 for New User (New Non-User) firm observations and 0 for matched control firm 
observations. POST equals 1 for periods after derivatives initiation (termination) for New Users (New Non-
Users) and corresponding control firms (0 otherwise). The coefficient on NEWUSER×POST 
(NEWUSER×POST) reflects the difference-in-differences estimator of the effects of derivatives initiation 
(termination) on the frequency of management earnings forecasts. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Robust standard errors (RSE) are 
clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). Variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Table 6 
Test of supply channel  
 
Panel A: Hedge accounting users vs. Non-hedge accounting users  
  FREQ  
  Coeff.  RSE  
  HEDGE_USER                                        
Ψ1 
Ψ1 0.190 *** 0.043  
  NONHEDGE_USER Ψ2 0.083 ** 0.033  
  INST  0.210 *** 0.049  
  SIZE  0.144 *** 0.014  
  FOL  0.005 * 0.003  
  BIGN  0.049  0.059  
  LITIGATION  0.056  0.047  
  MB  −0.008 ** 0.004  
  NEGNEWS  0.020  0.018  
  ExPOST_EVOL  −1.736 *** 0.374  
  ABRETVOL  −1.584 *** 0.233  
  ABACC  −0.146 ** 0.070  
    Industry FE  Yes  
Year FE Yes  
R2 0.06  
Wald χ2 (model) 3,066.97***  
Observations 21,880  
Wald χ2: Ψ1 = Ψ2  5.62**  
 
Panel B: Effective hedgers (EH) vs. Speculator/ineffective hedgers (SPIN)    
  FREQ  
  Coeff.  RSE  
  NEWUSER_EH                                        
Ψ1 
 −0.112  0.071  
  NEWUSER_SPIN                                         0.044  0.101  
  POST  −0.165 ** 0.066  
  NEWUSER_EH×POST                                        0.197 ** 0.079  
  NEWUSER_SPIN×POST                                        
NEWUSER_SPIN×POST                                     
0.130  0.107  
  INST 0.225 *** 0.062  
  SIZE  0.167 *** 0.019  
  FOL  0.001  0.003  
  BIGN  0.091  0.084  
  LITIGATION  0.073  0.059  
  MB  −0.011 ** 0.005  
  NEGNEWS  0.030  0.022  
  ExPOST_EVOL  −2.461 *** 0.560  
  ABRETVOL  −2.003 *** 0.317  
  ABACC  −0.105  0.093  
    Industry FE  Yes  
Year FE Yes  
R2 0.06  
Wald χ2 (model) 2,039.73***  
Observations 13,591  
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Panel C: Effect of SFAS 133 on hedge accounting users  
  (1)  (2) 
  FREQ  FREQ 
  Coeff.  RSE  Coeff.  RSE 
  SFAS133      1.368 *** 0.099  1.111 *** 0.085 
  HEDGE_USER      −0.081  0.127 
  SFAS133×HEDGE_USER                                          0.292 ** 0.133 
  INST  0.321 *** 0.110  0.216 *** 0.064 
  SIZE  0.088 *** 0.029  0.119 *** 0.018 
  FOL  −0.003  0.005  −0.001  0.003 
  BIGN  0.414 * 0.211  0.138  0.098 
  LITIGATION  0.143  0.101  0.172 *** 0.059 
  MB  −0.004  0.005  −0.004  0.004 
  NEGNEWS  0.079 ** 0.033  0.027  0.023 
  ExPOST_EVOL  −4.845 *** 1.311  −2.899 *** 0.830 
  ABRETVOL  −2.570 *** 0.483  −2.679 *** 0.320 
  ABACC  −0.007  0.177  −0.182 * 0.109 
     Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
Year FE No  No 
R2 0.05  0.04 
Wald χ2 (model) 515.77***  1,053.94*** 
Observations 3,294  9,721 
This table reports tests of whether the association between derivatives use and management forecast activity 
is stronger when derivatives make earnings easier to forecast (i.e., the supply channel tests). Panel A presents 
a test of whether hedge accounting users are more likely to issue earnings forecasts than non-hedge 
accounting users. Panel B reports the results of the difference-in-differences tests on whether effective 
hedgers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts than speculator/ineffective hedgers after derivatives 
initiation. Panel C presents tests of how SFAS 133 influences the frequency of earnings forecasts issued by 
hedge accounting users. Column (1) uses a sample of hedge accounting users only whereas Column (2) uses 
all derivatives users including non-hedge accounting users (9,721 obs.). *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Robust standard errors (RSE) are 
clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). Variables are defined in Appendix A.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 
Table 7 
Test of demand channel  
 
Panel A: Demand due to the economic complexity of derivatives  
  (1)  (2) 
  FREQ  FREQ 
  USER with Low Complexity  USER with High Complexity 
  Coeff.  RSE  Coeff.  RSE 
  USER     Ψ1 0.076 *** 0.029  0.063 ** 0.032 
  INST  0.209 *** 0.049  0.211 *** 0.049 
  SIZE  0.159 *** 0.013  0.153 *** 0.014 
  FOL  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.003 
  BIGN  0.060  0.059  0.060  0.059 
  LITIGATION  0.047  0.047  0.046  0.047 
  MB  −0.008 ** 0.004  −0.008 ** 0.004 
  NEGNEWS  0.027  0.017  0.025  0.018 
  ExPOST_EVOL  −1.761 *** 0.374  −1.785 *** 0.378 
  ABRETVOL  −1.588 *** 0.233  −1.624 *** 0.233 
  ABACC  −0.145 ** 0.070  −0.146 ** 0.070 
     Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
R2 0.06  0.06 
Wald χ2 (model) 3,053.00***  3,019.74*** 
Observations 21,880  21,880 
Wald χ2: Ψ1 (1) = Ψ1 (2) 0.07   
 
Panel B: Demand from sell-side analysts    
  (1)  (2) 
  FREQ  FREQ 
   Low Analyst Following  High Analyst Following 
  Coeff.  RSE  Coeff.  RSE 
  USER                                        
Ψ1 
Ψ1 0.153 *** 0.043  0.077 ** 0.036 
  INST  0.064  0.072  0.165 *** 0.060 
  SIZE  0.123 *** 0.021  0.111 *** 0.018 
  FOL  0.072 *** 0.010  −0.007 ** 0.003 
  BIGN  0.037  0.072  −0.027  0.083 
  LITIGATION  0.055  0.060  0.060  0.062 
  MB  −0.011 ** 0.006  −0.004  0.004 
  NEGNEWS  0.019  0.027  0.013  0.022 
  ExPOST_EVOL  −2.444 *** 0.574  −1.026 ** 0.439 
  ABRETVOL  −1.181 *** 0.298  −2.480 *** 0.354 
  ABACC  −0.211 ** 0.103  −0.090  0.092 
     Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
R2 0.06  0.05 
Wald χ2 (model) 1,567.64***  1,311.75*** 
Observations 11,785  10,095 
Wald χ2: Ψ1 (1) = Ψ1 (2) 2.07   
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Panel C: Demand from institutional investors 
  (1)  (2) 
  FREQ  FREQ 
  Low Institutional Ownership  High Institutional Ownership 
  Coeff.  RSE  Coeff.  RSE 
  USER     Ψ1 0.095 ** 0.044  0.132 *** 0.037 
  INST  0.004  0.102  0.294  0.159 
  SIZE  0.170 *** 0.019  0.115 *** 0.019 
  FOL  0.005  0.004  0.005  0.003 
  BIGN  −0.035  0.074  0.095  0.083 
  LITIGATION  −0.005  0.066  0.078  0.057 
  MB  −0.013 ** 0.005  −0.002  0.004 
  NEGNEWS  0.066 ** 0.029  −0.014  0.021 
  ExPOST_EVOL  −1.279 *** 0.389  −2.516 *** 0.587 
  ABRETVOL  −0.901 *** 0.295  −2.347 *** 0.348 
  ABACC  −0.137  0.104  −0.163 * 0.094 
     Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
R2 0.07  0.04 
Wald χ2 (model) 1,705.74***  1,282.20*** 
Observations 10,940  10,940 
Wald χ2: Ψ1 (1) = Ψ1 (2) 0.44   
This table reports tests of whether the association between derivatives use and management forecast activity 
is stronger when investors demand more information about complex derivatives use (i.e., the demand channel 
tests). Panel A presents a test of whether users with high derivatives complexity are more likely to issue 
earnings forecasts than users with low complexity. We designate firm-years with at least two types of 
derivatives instruments as a sample of high derivatives complexity and that of low complexity otherwise. 
Panel B (Panel C) reports tests of whether subsamples with high analyst following (high institutional 
ownership) issue more earnings forecasts than those with low analyst following (low institutional 
ownership). Subsamples in Panels B and C are created based on the median of analyst following and 
institutional ownership, respectively. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Robust standard errors (RSE) are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). Variables 
are defined in Appendix A.   
 
